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ABSTRACT: Impressive growth in public support for the
European Community took place during the decade follow-
ing its founding; there is reason to believe that this
development was partly due to the exceptional prosperity
then prevailing in the Community’s member nations. Con-
versely, there is evidence that the troubled economic
conditions present since expansion of the Community in
1973 have had the opposite effect&mdash;subject to some important
limiting factors. Analysis of public opinion survey data re-
veals a positive correlation between support for Community
membership and a given nation’s level of industrial pro-
duction at a given time point; and a negative correla-
tion with rates of inflation. Nevertheless, long-term in-
fluences seem to dominate the effects of the immediate
economic context. Among these long-term factors, length of
membership in the Community seems particularly important.
But the presence of "Post-Materialist" value priorities,
and of relatively high levels of "Cognitive Mobilization"
also show significant linkages with public support for
European integration.
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I N THE Spring of 1979, the elec-JL torates of nine nations will vote
for their representatives in the first
directly-elected European Parlia-
ment in history. This event con-
stitutes a major advance for public
involvement in shaping the Euro-
pean Community, for European in-
tegration was initially a process that
was almost exclusively restricted to
collaboration between a relative
handful of highly-placed elites. With
the national referenda of 1972 and
1975, when membership or non-
membership in the European Com-
munity for Ireland, Norway, Den-
mark and Great Britain was decided
by the electorates of the four re-
spective countries, it marked the
first public ratification of a Euro-
pean integration effort. The Euro-
pean Parliament will place the af-
fairs of the Community under the
permanent scrutiny of representa-
tives elected by the voters of all
nine member countries. It is a good
time to take stock of the evolution
of mass attitudes toward Europe’s
supranational institutions.
To date, these institutions have
been all too remote from the general
public, being guided exclusively by
appointed officials. As a result, they
have lacked the political base and
the democratic legitimacy that might
justify their playing a more impor-
tant role in dealing with some of
the major problems that currently
beset the European Community as a
whole. By themselves, direct elec-
tions will not clear the way for a
greater degree of European decision-
making, but they could facilitate
this development. Whether they do
so or not depends on how much
backing the publics of the nine
nations accord the European institu-
tions, and whether they are ready to
support decisionmakers who act at
the European level, with an eye to
the interests of the European Com-
munity as a whole rather than an
exclusive focus on the interests of a
particular nation. This article will
analyze relevant trends in mass
attitudes toward European integra-
tion, in an effort to interpret these
trends and some of the factors under-
lying them.
PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EXPANDED
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The decade following the found-
ing of the European Economic Com-
munity in 1958 was a period of
unprecedented prosperity and high
expectations. During these years,
support for European unification
among the publics of the original
six member nations showed a clear
tendency toward upward conver-
gence. At first, sharply divided
along Left-Right lines, the French
and Italian publics gradually moved
toward a pro-European consensus
that extended across the political
spectrum, bringing them up to the
initially higher levels of support that
prevailed among the publics of Ger-
many, The Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg. This evolution
seems to have been favored by the
prosperity then prevailing, which
tended (rightly or wrongly) to be
attributed in part to membership
in the European Community.
The British public remained out-
side the Community during this
period, at first by the choice of their
own government, and subsequently
as a result of two successive Gaul-
list vetoes of British entry. The
general contours of the flow of pub-
lic opinion from 1952 to 1975 are
indicated by Figure 1; the process
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FIGURE 1
THE EVOLUTION OF SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, 1952-1975.
Based on percent &dquo;for&dquo; &dquo;efforts to unify Europe.&dquo; Missing data are included in
percentage base; thus, in 1952, 70 percent of the German public was &dquo;for,&dquo; 10 percent
&dquo;against&dquo; and 20 percent &dquo;undecided&dquo; or &dquo;no opinion.&dquo;
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has been examined elsewhere in
greater detail. 1
The expanded nine-nation Euro-
pean Community came into being in
1973, on the eve of the most serious
economic recession since the 1930s.
In sharp contrast to the prosperity
of the Community’s early years, the
publics of the expanded Community
have experienced varying degrees of
economic stagnation, accompanied
by extraordinarily high inflation, and
the highest levels of unemployment
since the immediate postwar era.
Though they differ in detail, al-
most all of the major theorists who
have worked in this area concur
that favorable economic payoffs are
conducive to-and perhaps even
essential to-the processes of na-
tional and supranational integra-
tion.2 Similarly, David Easton views
mass support for a political system
as the result of positive govern-
mental outputs. In time, a series of
outputs that are perceived as bene-
ficial may build up a reservoir of
&dquo;diffuse support&dquo; that is not con-
tingent on immediate payoffs, but
the generation of diffuse support
can be traced back to favorable
outputs at an earlier time, with
economic outputs being the most
obvious type and perhaps the most
widely appreciated one.3 Has mass
support for the European Com-
munity institutions continued to
develop in the uncertain economic
climate that has prevailed since
1973, or has there been a growing
sense of disenchantment?
It seems that both things have oc-
curred in connection with different
aspects of mass attitudes. In order
to grasp what has been happening,
it is important to distinguish be-
tween diffuse or &dquo;affective&dquo; support
and &dquo;utilitarian&dquo; support-a calcu-
lated appraisal of the immediate
costs and benefits of membership
in the Community.4 The latter seems
to have moved downhill to some
extent from 1973 to 1977, though
with important cross-national differ-
ences in how far it went. But along
with this development, a sense of
solidarity among the nine nations of
the European Community has
emerged among all nine publics-
a solidarity that includes a sur-
1. See Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revo-
lution: Changing Values and Political Styles
Among Western Publics (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1977), Chap. 12.
2. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of
Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1958); Ernst B. Haas and Phillipe C.
Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Pat-
terns of Political Integration: Projections
About Unity in Latin America," Interna-
tional Organization, vol. 18 (Autumn 1964),
pp. 705-37; Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political
Community and The North Atlantic Area
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957);
Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold,
Europe’s Would-Be Polity (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
"Comparative Regional Integration: Concept
and Measurement," International Organiza-
tion, vol. 22 (Autumn 1968), pp. 855-80; Lind-
berg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integra-
tion : Theory and Research (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1971); Amitai
Etzioni, Political Unification (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Philip
E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The
Integration of Political Communities (Phila-
delphia : Lippincott, 1964); and Charles Pent-
land, International Theory and European
Integration (New York: The Free Press,
1973).
3. See David Easton, A Framework for
Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 124-26. Cf. Sey-
mour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites
of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy," American Political
Science Review 53, 1 (March, 1959).
4. For a discussion of utilitarian support
versus affective support, see David Handley,
"Public Support for European Integration"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Geneva, 1975); cf.
Werner Feld and John Wildgen, Domestic
Political Realities and European Integration
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976).
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prisingly widespread willingness to
share economic burdens in time of
difficulties, and a certain readiness
to place the interests of the Com-
munity as a whole above those of
one’s own nation. It may be that
the sheer passage of time under
common supranational institutions
-provided they are entered into
voluntarily-gradually instils the
habit of viewing things from a per-
spective broader than that of the
nation-state, even in the absence of
material rewards.
As Deutsch has suggested, sym-
bolic rewards can sometimes sub-
stitute for economic ones, and the
experience of struggle against com-
mon difficulties can encourage a
sense of solidarity even in times of
adversity.5 In short: unfavorable eco-
nomic conditions seem to have en-
gendered a decline in the prevalence
of positive assessments of member-
ship, but they have not prevented
the growth of a sense of European
Community solidarity. Let us ex-
amine the evidence on both points.
In late October and early Novem-
ber of 1977, representative national
samples of the publics of the nine
European Community countries were
interviewed as part of a regular
program of surveys carried out twice
each year under the sponsorship
of the Commission of the European
Community.~ The respondents were
asked: &dquo;Generally speaking, do you
think that (your country’s) member-
ship in the Common Market is a
good thing, a bad thing, or neither
good nor bad?&dquo; This question is
phrased in a way that makes it easy
for those who have no clear opinion
to select the neutral option. Dimen-
sional analysis of data from earlier
surveys indicated that this item was
a good indicator of responses to a
broad cluster of attitudes concern-
ing support for, or opposition to,
European integration. Consequently,
this item was included as a stand-
ard question in all subsequent
European Community surveys. The
distribution of responses in Fall,
1977 appears in Table 1.
In the Community as a whole, a
clear majority felt that their coun-
try’s membership was a good thing,
Ireland. The organizations responsible for
fieldwork in each country are: DIMARSO/
INRA (Luxembourg and Belgium); Gallup
Markedanalyse (Denmark); EMNID-Institut
(Germany); Institut Francais d’Opinion Pub-
lique (France); Irish Marketing Surveys
(Ireland); Instituto per le Richerche Statis-
tische e 1’Analyisi dell’Opinione Publica
(DOXA-Italy); Nederlands Institut voor de
Publieke Opinie (NIPO-Netherlands); and
Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup Poll-Great Brit-
ain). Fieldwork in Northern Ireland is con-
ducted jointly by Irish Marketing Surveys
and Social Surveys (Gallup Poll). In Ger-
many, fieldwork for the 1973 survey was
carried out by Gesellschaft fiir Marktfor-
5. See Karl W. Deutsch, Political Com-
munity, Chap. 3.
6. Field work for the Euro-Barometer
series has been carried out by the Euro-
pean Omnibus Survey&mdash;a consortium con-
sisting of the European affiliates of the
Gallup survey group&mdash;except in Belgium and
Luxembourg where the surveys were con-
ducted by INRA. In these surveys, samples
of approximately 1,000 respondents are inter-
viewed in each country except Luxembourg,
where the N is approximately 300; and in
the United Kingdom, where 1,000 respond-
ents are interviewed in Great Britain and
300 respondents are interviewed in Northern
l
&uuml;r
schung and for the 1970 survey by In-
stitut f&uuml;r Demoskopie. In Britain, the 1970
survey was conducted by Louis Harris Re-
search, Ltd. In the Netherlands, the 1973
survey was carried out by Nederlandse
Stichting voor Statistiek. International coor-
dination of the Euro-Barometer surveys is
directed by Hel&egrave;ne Riffault of IFOP and
Norman Webb of Social Surveys (Gallup
Poll). Fieldwork for the Fall, 1977 survey
took place from October 24 to November
8, 1977. For a more detailed report of
findings from this survey, see Commission
of the European Communities, Euro-Barom-
eter Number 8: Public Opinion in the Euro-




PUBLIC APPRAISAL OF THEIR NATION’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: FALL, 1977
* Each national sample weighted in proportion to that nation’s population.
with positive assessments outweigh-
ing negative ones by a four-to-one
ratio even in this relatively un-
certain economic context. But a
marked contrast is apparent when
we compare the appraisal given by
the publics of the six original
member countries with those of the
three new members. In both Den-
mark and the United Kingdom, posi-
tive and negative evaluations are
almost evenly balanced, with nega-
tive ratings actually outweighing
positive ones in the latter country.
The third new member public, the
Irish, manifest a much more favor-
able attitude but even there nega-
tive appraisals are more than twice
as numerous as in any of the original
six nations. The fact that Ireland is
relatively favorable is- not particu-
larly surprising: adherence to the
Common Market has secured entry
on favorable terms to a large market
for Irish agricultural products-
something particularly important for
a country that is still heavily
agrarian. Moreover, Irish member-
ship seems to have encouraged a
boom in industrial development,
linked with the fact that Ireland has
one of the lowest costs for indus-
trial production of any region within
the European Community.
Nevertheless, the overall pattern
cannot be attributed solely to differ-
ences in currently prevailing eco-
nomic conditions. All nine countries
have suffered seriously from the ef-
fects of the recent recession. The
striking difference in the balance of
positive and negative appraisals be-
tween the original six and the three
new member countries seems to
reflect the presence or absence of a
reservoir of diffuse support built
up over a long period of time,
raising evaluations among the six
well above the level that would be
expected on the basis of current
economic factors alone.
How resistant is such support to
decay in the face of adverse cur-
rent conditions? Table 2 shows the
percentage making a positive ap-
praisal of their country’s member-
ship in the Common Market, in each
nation, for each of the nine time
points at which the current series
of surveys has been conducted. As a
detailed inspection of these re-
sults shows, positive evaluations
remained at relatively high levels
in each of the original six member
nations throughout the period from
1973 through 1977. Positive ap-
praisals have, on the whole, been
much less widespread in the three
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new member countries; and their
support levels have shown some-
what greater volatility over time,
as if they were more responsive
to current influences. Figure 2 pro-
vides a graphic presentation of the
data in Table 2, combining the re-
sults from the six in an average
weighted according to population.
The graph reveals a pattern that may
be more difficult to see in Table 2.
Though the oscillations are greater
among the publics of the three new
members than among the six, there
is a certain parallelism in the rise
and fall of attitudes toward Common
Market membership in both sets of
countries: favorable assessments
reach a peak in Fall 1975, plummet
to a low point in 1976 and then
show a tendency to recover in 1977.
This pattern bears an interesting
relationship to the rise and fall of
the Index of Industrial Production
for the respective nations, which is
shown in Figure 3.
Let us assume that public assess-
ments of the Common Market have
been influenced, at least to some
extent, by the economic fortunes
of the respondent’s country, of
which the Index of Industrial Pro-
duction is one indicator. If this is
the case, we must note that there
is a lag of about a year between
changes in our economic indicator
and changes in mass attitudes. With
the onset of the recent recession,
the Index of Industrial Production
declined, sometimes precipitously,
in all nine countries, reaching a
low point in 1975-the year in
which positive evaluations of the
Common Market were at a peak.
Industrial production made a sub-
sequent recovery, with most nations
regaining or surpassing their 1973
levels by the Fall of 1976-when
public assessments in most coun-
tries were at their low point. Need-
less to say, there were cross-national
deviations from the general pattern;
on the whole, they reflect changes
in industrial production reasonably
well. On one hand, the recovery
of favorable attitudes has been
relatively weak and occurred rela-
tively late in Britain-which ac-
cords with the fact that British
industrial production in 1977 was
still below its 1973 level. Con-
versely, the recession had a com-
paratively mild impact on Ireland’s
economy. To be sure, her per capita
TABLE 2
PUBLIC APPRAISAL OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1973-1977
(PERCENTAGE SAYING THAT THEIR COUNTRY’S MEMBERSHIP
Is &dquo;A GOOD THING&dquo;)
* Surveys were carried out in Great Britain only, in 1973 and 1974; from 1975 on, the figures for the
&dquo;United Kingdom&dquo; include Northern Ireland as well.
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FIGURE 2
APPRAISAL OF MEMBERSHIP IN COMMON MARKET, 1973-1977.
PERCENTAGE SAYING THAT THEIR COUNTRY’S MEMBERSHIP
is &dquo;A GOOD THING.&dquo;
income was low by comparison with
the rest of the European Com-
munity, and her unemployment
level relatively high, but both of
these things have been true of
Ireland for decades. Presumably,
it is changes from one’s accustomed
condition that influence public ap-
praisals of the benefits of member-
ship in the Community. In terms
of recent change, Ireland fared rela-
tively well. Her Index of Indus-
trial Production showed only a
modest decline by 1975, and made
an exceptionally strong recovery
thereafter, standing far above her
1973 level in 1977.
If there is, indeed, a lag of a year
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FIGURE 3
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION RATES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES,
1973-1977 (SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, 1970 = 100).
or so between changes in industrial
production and changes in mass
attitudes toward the Community,
the next surveys should show a
further rise in favorable appraisals
of Common Market membership in
Ireland and several other European
Community countries. The exist-
ence of such a lag seems entirely
plausible: one would expect to find
some such delay, since the con-
sequences of changing rates of
production do not immediately im-
pinge upon the general public, and
there might well be some further
delay before the public began to
attribute these effects to any given
cause.
The regression of our attitudinal
variable on a given nation’s index
of industrial production one year
before the given survey yields a
correlation of .253 .7 This lag pro-
vides our best fit: the correlations
with the index at earlier points in
time yield lower values and the
correlation with the index at the time
of the survey is only .194. Though
a correlation of .253 is scarcely
overwhelming, it is significant at
better than the .05 level when deal-
ing with 81 data points, as we are
here. Public evaluations of member-
ship in the Community seem linked
with economic growth or decline.
Can we explain more of the vari-
ance in attitudes by utilizing addi-
tional economic indicators? Yes. The
best such measure, for present pur-
poses, seems to be an indicator of
inflation. Figure 4 shows the Con-
sumer Price Indices for the nine
European Community countries from
1973 to 1977. Since these indices
show a steady upward trend while
our attitudinal measure does not,
it is evident that we need to use
the change in this index, during
some specified period preceding a
given survey, rather than the index
itself, as a predictor of attitudes.
Empirically, our best fit proves to be
the rise in a nation’s Consumer
Price Index during the two years
7. For these regression analyses, evalua-
tions of membership were coded as fol-
lows : Bad = 1, Neither = 2. Good = 3. The
mean score for a given nation at a given
point in time was the input to our aggregate
data set. Missing data were excluded from
calculations of the mean scores.
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FIGURE 4
INFLATION RATES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, 1973-1977 (1970 = 100).
preceding the given survey. The lag
involved here is longer, in a sense,
than that connected with the Index
of Industrial Production. This fact
is somewhat surprising: the average
consumer buys things almost every
day. One might expect that he or
she would become aware of infla-
tion almost immediately. This may
be true, but apparently it takes the
public a certain period of time to
connect inflation with EEC mem-
bership. Once this connection is
made, however, its impact is slightly
stronger than that associated with
rising or falling rates of industrial
production: our indicator of inflation
shows a -.268 correlation with
assessments of membership in the
Common Market. The negative polar-
ity, of course, indicates that rela-
tively high rates of inflation are
linked with negative assessments
of membership.
Utilizing our indicators of both
inflation and industrial production
in the regression equation, we ob-
tain a multiple correlation of .376.
Additional economic indicators (in-
cluding measures of the change in
unemployment rates) increase the
amount of variance explained only
very slightly; but our results do
seem to indicate that economic
conditions have a significant impact
on public appraisals of membership
in the E.E.C. These results support
the idea that favorable outputs tend
to enhance support for membership
in a political community, while
unfavorable ones have the opposite
effect-but only in a loose way.
It is unclear whether these &dquo;out-
puts&dquo; really come from the politi-
cal system in question: the reces-
sion and inflation of the 1970’s and
their subsequent abatement were
worldwide phenomena that prob-
ably were affected only marginally
by any actions taken by the Euro-
pean Community institutions. How-
ever, the publics concerned here did
seem to attribute prevailing eco-
nomic conditions to their member-
ship in the European Community,
to some extent, and if they did,
it is a significant fact. Given the
relatively low rates of economic
growth and high rates of inflation
that were present most of the time
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since 1973, the net result was a
slight decline in favorable assess-
ments. But it is important to dis-
tinguish between long-term effects
of membership and the impact of
immediate economic conditions.
As we noted above, the publics
of the original six member nations
retained a relatively favorable view
of membership throughout this pe-
riod. Long-term factors-perhaps a
reservoir of diffuse support built
up during the pre-1973 era-were
eroded only slightly. Let us put this
statement into quantitative terms.
We constructed a dummy variable
based on whether a given nation
joined the Community in 1958 or
in 1973. Its correlation with our
dependent variable is .896: this
variable alone explains considerably
more of the variance in attitudes
than any available economic indi-
cator or any combination of them.
It seems unlikely that anything
would greatly affect a correlation
of this size. And, when this variable
is used together with the economic
indicators described above, in a
multiple regression, neither the
partial correlation (.863) nor the
multiple correlation (.892) differ
much from the zero-order correla-
tion. It is impossible to prove, with
the present data base, that the pub-
lics of the six make relatively
positive evaluations of membership
because they have been members
for a relatively long time: it is con-
ceivable (though it seems unlikely)
that we are dealing with some cul-
tural predisposition that just hap-
pens to be much more prevalent
in the six than in the three. But
the results of these analyses do
clearly demonstrate the prepon-
derance of long-term effects over
those of the current economic en-
vironment, at least as measured by
these standard economic indicators.
The economic context is important.
Nation-specific effects, apparently
linked with long-term membership,
are even more important.
THE EMERGENCE OF A SENSE OF
COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY
Public evaluations of EEC mem-
bership remained static or declined
slightly from 1973 to 1977, for
reasons that seem related to the
troubled economic conditions of that
period. Those publics that were al-
ready strongly favorable to member-
ship in 1973 remained relatively
favorable, for the most part, while
those that had recently entered had
become only slightly more favor-
able or even a little less so by 1977.
We have dealt with only one
aspect of public attitudes toward
the Community, however. Assuredly
it is a crucial one, for if a people
conclude that their membership in
a given political community is no
longer a good thing, the next step
might well be to leave it. Still,
the appraisal of membership as
measured here does not tell the
whole story. The question we have
been dealing with is framed in a
way that tends to evoke an assess-
ment of the utilization aspects of
membership: one would expect such
assessments to reflect the current
economic context to a significant
degree. Let us examine a less
utilitarian, more affective aspect of
mass attitudes toward the Com-
munity.
At three points in time, represen-
tative samples of the nine European
Community publics have been asked:
&dquo;If one of the countries of the
Common Market (European Com-
munity) finds itself in major eco-
nomic difficulties, do you feel that
the other countries, including (your
country), should help it or not?&dquo; This
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question evokes responses concern-
ing what should be done, not simply
an appraisal of what has happened.
The responses obtained from each
public in 1973 appear in Table 3.
By comparison with appraisals of
the benefits of EEC membership,
the levels of support for Community
solidarity were strikingly high. There
was a good deal more opposition
in Denmark and the United King-
dom than in any of the original
six member nations, but the prin-
ciple of aiding other European Com-
munity countries in time of need
was endorsed by strong majorities
in all nine countries.
In a sense, these high levels of
support for European Community
solidarity are not surprising. The
Danish and Irish publics had just
voted to join the Community in
1972, in national referenda that
evoked intense and widespread dis-
cussion of the choice being made.
There would seem to be little sense
in joining, unless one were com-
mitted to a certain degree of solidar-
ity. The British electorate had not
yet been consulted on the sub-
ject, but their representatives in
Parliament had debated extensively
and finally voted in favor of joining
the European Community by a con-
clusive majority: cues from the
political elites tended to encourage
a sense of solidarity-which was
endorsed by a 2:1 majority among
the British public. The ratio was
almost 7:1 in the Community as a
whole, however. These high levels
of support for Community solidarity
were expressed during the first year
of membership for the three new
countries. The very fact that the
Community had just been expanded,
after years of debate and difficult
negotiations, may have given the
Community a psychological boost
that would not necessarily last; all
of this took place before the Arab
oil embargo of October, 1973 and
the sharp economic decline of 1974
and 1975. Would this remarkably
high level of public support for
economic solidarity collapse in the
fact of real, rather than hypotheti-
cal, economic difficulties? For the
Community as a whole, the answer
is a clear-cut &dquo;No.&dquo;
Table 4 shows the levels of sup-
port for Community solidarity at
each of the three points in time
when this question was asked.
The same data are summarized in
graphic form in Figure 5, with re-
sults from the original six members
combined in an average weighted
according to national populations.
The overall pattern is not one of
collapse, but of upward conver-
gence. Among the original six, sup-
TABLE 3
SENSE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY, FALL, 1973: IF A MEMBER COUNTRY IS IN MAJOR
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, SHOULD THE OTHER COUNTRIES-INCLUDING YOUR
OWN-HELP IT? (RESPONSES FROM SURVEY IN LATE SEPTEMBER
AND EARLY OCTOBER, 1973)
* Weighted in proportion to national populations; unweighted N = 13,484.
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TABLE 4
SENSE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY,
1973-1975 (PERCENTAGE SAYING THEIR
COUNTRY SHOULD HELP ANOTHER
E.C. NATION IN DIFFICULTY)
port for economic solidarity re-
mained at very high levels, with
little overall change. And among the
three new member publics, support
for Community solidarity showed a
substantial rise. Ireland, which al-
ready ranked high in 1973, rose to
a level slightly higher than the
average for the original six; while
the British and Danish publics
showed substantial gains that left
them only slightly below the six.
It seems significant that the Ger-
man level of support showed a
moderate but appreciable decline,
while the Italian level showed a
comparable rise-during this period
Germany was called upon to provide
actual economic aid to Italy, and
did provide it. Nevertheless, even
in Germany the proponents of eco-
nomic solidarity prevailed over its
opponents by more than 7:1 in
November 1977; and for the Com-
munity as a whole there was an
upward shift. Its magnitude, weighted
according to the size of national
populations, is a net gain of three
percentage points from 1973 to 1977.
This is a modest figure, to be sure,
but we tend to run into ceiling
effects. In the case of the original
six, the percentages favoring soli-
darity simply cannot rise very much
farther; outright opposition was
already very low in 1973 and a cer-
tain proportion of nonresponse seems
inevitable in any national public
opinion survey. The gain was con-
centrated almost entirely in the
three new member nations. The fact
that there has been a pattern of
upward convergence, with the new
members catching up with the orig-
inal six, seems more significant than
the absolute size of the overall
upward movement.
Despite the uncertain economic
climate that has prevailed since ex-
pansion of the European Com-
munity in 1973, there have been
important gains in the prevalence of
a sense of Community solidarity.
As was suggested earlier, the sheer
passage of time under common
supranational institutions may tend
to instill the habit of viewing things
from a broader perspective than
that of the nation-state, even in the
absence of material rewards. The
Fall 1977 survey provides another
piece of evidence that helps ex-
plain the surprising fact that a
sense of Community solidarity be-
came more widespread from 1973
to 1977, while public appraisals of
the benefits of membership were
stagnant or showed a tendency to
decline. In addition to asking each
respondent whether he or she felt
that membership was a good or bad
thing, they were asked, &dquo;And do you
think that (your country’s) member-
ship in the Common Market is a
good thing, a bad thing or neither
in the light of (your country’s)
future in the next ten or fifteen
years?&dquo; Pluralities (and in most
cases, clear majorities) of the pub-
lics of all nine countries felt that
their country’s membership would
prove to be a good thing in ten
or fifteen years time. For example,
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while only 35 percent of the British
public felt that British membership
was a good thing in the Fall of
1977, 48 percent felt that it would
be a good thing in the long run.
It is, of course, impossible to say
what actually will have happened
by 1988 or 1993. But the differ-
ence between the two responses
suggests that, while the various
publics were quite aware of the
troubled circumstances of the re-
cent past, they had not lost hope
for the Community’s future.
DIRECT ELECTIONS TO
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
There is additional evidence of a
growing sense of European Com-
munity solidarity. It concerns the
forthcoming direct elections to the
European Parliament. Public sup-
port for holding such elections has,
itself, shown impressive growth.
Earlier a matter of controversy,
particularly in the new member
nations, by 1977 a consensus had
emerged throughout the Commu-
nity in favor of them. Over time,
the idea of holding such elections
has evolved from a hypothetical
proposal to a coming reality, which
has probably encouraged public
acceptance. It has also required
certain changes in the wording of
the survey items designed to meas-
ure public support or opposition
to the European elections.
In 1970, representative samples
of the publics of the six countries
that were then members were asked:
&dquo;Are you for or against the election
of a European parliament by popu-
lar vote of all the citizens of the
member states of the European
Community?&dquo; A similar question
was asked in Great Britain, but
since it was not then a member of
the Community, it was placed in the
context of hypothetical British entry.
The question was repeated in 1973,
except that this time four cate-
gories of response were offered:
&dquo;completely in favor,&dquo; &dquo;favor on the
whole,&dquo; &dquo;disagree in general,&dquo; and
&dquo;disagree completely.&dquo; By Spring,
1975, a concrete proposal was being
discussed to hold direct elections
to the European Parliament in 1978,
and the question was worded: &dquo;One
of the main proposals is to elect a
European Parliament in May 1978,
by a popular vote of all the citizens
in the member states of the Euro-
pean Community (Common Mar-
ket). Are you, yourself, for or against
this proposal? How strongly do
you feel about it?&dquo; The same four
response categories were offered as
in 1973; and this question was
repeated in each survey through
May 1976. By Fall 1976, agreement
had been reached on the goal of
holding direct elections in May
1978 (although important details
remained to be worked out that,
in fact, delayed the elections un-
til Spring 1979). Accordingly, in
Fall 1976 the question was phrased:
&dquo;The governments of the member
countries of the Common Market
have reached agreement to hold the
first elections to the European Par-
liament by universal suffrage, that
is, by direct vote of all citizens,
in May 1978. Are you, yourself, for
or against this particular election?&dquo;
The same four response categories
were offered as stated above. In
Spring and Fall 1977, the intro-
ductory wording was simplified to
read: &dquo;In 1978, elections for the
European Parliament are planned
in every country of the Common
Market including (your country).
Everybody will be entitled to vote.
Are you, yourself, for or against
this particular election?&dquo; Again, four
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FIGURE 5
SENSE OF EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY, 1973-1977. PERCENTAGE SAYING THAT THEIR COUNTRY
SHOULD HELP ANOTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY IN DIFFICULTY.
response categories were offered.
Figure 6 shows the changes over
time in the percentage completely
favorable, or to some extent favor-
able, to a directly-elected European
Parliament. Despite the various
changes in wording of the question,
and the shift from a distant possi-
bility to a measure that had been
approved by the respective govern-
ments, support for a directly-elected
European Parliament changed only
gradually in the original six mem-
ber countries, rising from a weighted
average of 60 percent favorable in
1970, to 74 percent favorable in
Fall 1977. Changes among the pub-
lics of the three new member coun-
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FIGURE 6
PERCENTAGE &dquo;FOR&dquo; A DIRECTLY ELECTED EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 1970-1977.
tries were dramatic by comparison.
In 1970, only 25 percent of the
British public were favorable, while
a 55 percent majority were opposed
to a directly elected European Par-
liament. By late 1977, support was
voiced by 69 percent and opposi-
tion by only 18 percent. In our
earliest Danish survey, nine months
after Danish entry, only 36 percent
were favorable while 43 percent
were opposed. By 1977 these figures
had shifted to 54 percent and 29
percent, respectively. In Ireland, a
45 percent plurality were already
favorable to a directly elected Euro-
pean Parliament in 1973, but this
figure rose to 74 percent in 1977.
Once again, we find the phe-
nomenon of upward convergence,
with the three new member publics
catching up with the original six,
but here the evidence is far stronger
than anything we have seen above.
It seems likely that much of the
change since 1975 is due to a process s
in which the publics became aware
of, and influenced by, decisions
made by national elites. But if this
were the case, it illustrates force-
fully the extent to which these
publics can be mobilized in support
of European institutions when their
generally favorable predispositions
are reinforced by positive action on
the part of political leaders.
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The growth of public backing for
direct elections to the European
Parliament is impressive, but it is
probably a relatively soft indicator
of a sense of European solidarity.
One might favor such elections in
the belief that the European Par-
liament will remain unimportant; or
because one sees it as a forum for
the defense of national interests.
The 1977 surveys included a ques-
tion that enables us to examine the
latter possibility. It is also a rela-
tively &dquo;difficult&dquo; question that helps
provide an indication of the dis-
tribution of hard-core Europeans,
because it explicitly pits the national
interest against that of the Com-
munity as a whole. The item is:
&dquo;Which of the following attitudes
would you expect a (British, French,
etc.) member of the European Par-
liament to have?
-He should support things that are
good for Europe as a whole, even
if they are not always good for (my
country) at the time.
-He should support the interests of
(my country) all the time whether
or not they are good for Europe as
a whole.
The responses to this item in Fall
1977 appear in Table 5.
The proportion according priority
to the interest of Europe as a whole
above the national interest is far
smaller than the proportion favoring
a directly-elected European Parlia-
ment, as one would expect. In the
three new member countries the
national interest is clearly pre-
ponderant over that of the Com-
munity. In Belgium, the two are in
nearly even balance. But in the re-
maining five of the original six
member countries-and in the Com-
munity as a whole-the predomi-
nant attitude is to feel that one’s
representative in the European Par-
liament should support measures
that are good for Europe as a whole,
even if they run counter to the
immediate national interest.
This question has not been asked
over a sufficient period of years
to enable us to draw any conclu-
sions about long-term trends. The
fact that the publics of the older
member countries are substantially
more likely to give priority to Euro-
pean interests suggests that the
formation of a European outlook is
something that develops rather
slowly. It does not, however, neces-
sarily indicate the direction in which
the three newer publics are moving.
In a sense, this item provides a
test of whether an individual is pre-
pared to become a citizen of Europe.
And the results indicate that Euro-
peans do exist. They are outnum-
bered by those who are citizens of a
given country first and foremost,
among the three newer members
of the Community. But among those
publics that had experienced almost
twenty years of membership in the
Community by Fall 1977, the Euro-
peans seemed to comprise a majority.
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DIFFERENCES
IN ASSESSMENT OF MEMBERSHIP
AND A SENSE OF COMMUNITY
SOLIDARITY
Up to this point we have focused
entirely on variations in public atti-
tudes across nations and across time.
Nations are not monolithic, how-
ever ; within each country, one finds
substantial differences in support
for European integration between
people of different sex, age, occupa-
tion, political loyalties and educa-
tional levels. In order to under-
stand changes over time in the sup-
port levels of given nationalities,
we must analyze these individual-
level differences as well as the
political and economic environment
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of given nations at given times.
For example, the upward conver-
gence of the French and Italian
publics with the other publics of
the original six-member European
Community can be attributed, in
large part, to the conversion of the
communist electorates of these coun-
tries from hostile to favorable orien-
tations toward integration.8 8
Among those individual-level char-
acteristics that show substantial
associations with support for Euro-
pean integration, education is prob-
ably the most pervasive: the highly-
educated are consistently more fa-
vorable than the less-educated. This
finding emerges from virtually every
nationwide survey that has ever
been conducted on the subject.
The fact itself is clear and un-
mistakable. But it can be inter-
preted in a variety of ways.
On one hand, it could be at-
tributed to the fact that the more
educated tend to have higher in-
comes and more desirable jobs than
the less educated. Accordingly, the
argument might plausibly be de-
veloped that education is linked
with support for integration because
the more educated respondents
tend to be of higher social class
level; European integration benefits
the upper and middle classes more
than the working class; thus the
fact that the more educated are
relatively favorable to integration is
simply an expression of social class
interest.9 Carried a bit farther, one
could argue that support for Euro-
pean integration is inherently a
Right-wing political position, while
opposition to integration is the
natural stance of the Left. In sup-
port of this argument one could
marshal evidence that the electo-
rates of the. Left tend to be less
favorable to integration than those
of the Right. This is frequently,
but by no means universally true-
but one might save the hypothesis
by arguing that in some countries,
the electorates of the Left have
fallen prey to delusions. The im-
plication of this general interpreta-
tion is that the future growth or
decline of mass support for Euro-
pean integration depends essen-
tially on whether the Left or the
Right ultimately triumphs.
The foregoing interpretation makes
the assumption that the more edu-
cated are relatively pro-European
because they tend to come from
higher social class backgrounds.
But education is a complex vari-
able that taps many things. It is
indeed an indicator of one’s social
class. It is also an indicator of the
presence or absence of certain cog-
nitive skills, for the more educated
tend to know more, and are more
accustomed to dealing with abstrac-
tions and remote objects than the
less educated. Finally, education is
an indicator of one’s social milieu:
the more educated tend to move in
different circles, read or view differ-
ent media, and become exposed to
different influences from the less
educated. It may be true that the
8. See Inglehart, The Silent Revolution,
Chapter 12; and Robert D. Putnam, "Inter-
dependence and the Italian Communists,"
International Organization, 32, 2 (Spring,
1978), forthcoming.
9. In practice, it is difficult to demonstrate
that integration benefits the middle class
more than the working class. The former
unquestionably do have higher incomes and
social status, but there is very little evidence
that these differences would be smaller if
the Community did not exist. An alternative
version of the argument might therefore be
that, regardless of whether they actually do
benefit more, middle class respondents are
more likely to think that they do and this
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* Weighted in proportion to national populations.
more educated are relatively pro-
European simply because this is the
best way to pursue a distinctive
class interest. But it could work the
other way around: it might be that
any observed social class differences
in levels of support for European
integration result from the fact that
middle class respondents have, on
the whole, received more educa-
tion than working class respondents.
Let us compare the relative
strengths of the relationships be-
tween support for European integra-
tion and the respondent’s educa-
tional level on one hand, and the
occupation of the head of the re-
spondent’s household, on the other.
Table 6 shows the percentages
making positive appraisals of Euro-
pean Community membership by
education and occupation in the
European Community as a whole,
as of Fall 1977. Though there is
some cross-national variation in the
strength of these relationships, these
figures are reasonably representa-
tive of the pattern that is found
in each of the nine member nations
(though not, of course, of the ab-
solute levels). They are also fairly
typical of those found at other points
in time, though it seems worth
mentioning that both of these rela-
tionships were somewhat stronger
in 1977 than they were in 1973.
The first thing that we might
note is the fact that respondents
in households headed by manual
workers do, indeed, make less favor-
able appraisals of EEC member-
ship than those in households
headed by a person with a non-
manual occupation. The impression
that these data convey, however,
is scarcely one of social class
polarization: a majority of the re-
spondents in both manual and non-
manual households made favorable
appraisals; there is simply a differ-
ence in degree and the difference
is not overwhelming. Furthermore,
when we compare the responses of
all four broad occupational cate-
gories, there is no monotonic re-
lationship between income and the
proportion making favorable ap-
praisals : those from farm house-
holds have the lowest mean family
income but they prove to be fully as
favorable as our highest income
group, those from nonmanual house-
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TABLE 6
APPRAISAL OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
MEMBERSHIP BY EDUCATION AND BY






* Fall, 1977 nine-nation survey, weighted accord-
ing to population. Weighted N’s are shown in this
and subsequent tables.
holds. Finally, the apparent impact
of education on one’s attitude proves
to be stronger than the apparent
impact of one’s occupation. A simple
comparison of the size of the per-
centage differences between the
various groups suggests that this is
the case, and the relative size of
the Eta coefficients confirms it.
When we enter both variables into
a Multiple Classification Analysis
that adjusts for the effects of na-
tionality, income, age, and political
party preferences, as well as the
effects of education and occupa-
tion on each other, we obtain Beta
coefficients of .090 and .045 for
education and occupation, respec-
tively. Education proves to be a
more powerful predictor of attitudes
than does occupation. In other
words, our data give more support
to the hypothesis that middle class
respondents are relatively favorable
to European integration because
they tend to have relatively high
levels of education than to the con-
verse hypothesis.
But this still leaves unanswered
the question of why the more edu-
cated tend to be relatively favor-
able. Could it be due to the in-
fluence of distinctive political party
preferences? In general, the more
educated are more likely to support
relatively conservative political par-
ties than the less educated; and,
as we have noted, in most (though
not all) of the European Community
countries the parties of the Right
give more support to European
integration than those of the Left.
Could this be a cause of spurious
correlation? Again, the answer seems
to be no. Table 7 shows the dis-
tribution of favorable appraisals of
EEC membership among those who
support political parties of the Left
and Right respectively, at four points
in time in the Community as a
whole.
The electorates of the Left con-
sistently make less favorable assess-
ments of membership than do those
of the Right, although the gap seems
to have narrowed since 1973, but
the percentage differences found
here are even smaller than those
associated with manual versus non-
manual occupations. There are ma-
jor cross-national differences in the
explanatory power of this variable,
which we will touch on later. On
the whole, the partisan differences
are modest (the Eta coefficient
for this variable in Fall 1977 was
only .064). This fact suggests, and
more detailed statistical analysis
confirms, that the attitudinal differ-
ences by education and occupation
could be attributed to differential
political party preferences to only a
limited extent. The fact remains
that the more educated are con-
sistently more favorable to Euro-
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TABLE 7
APPRAISAL OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
MEMBERSHIP BY POLITICAL PARTY
PREFERENCE: 1973-1977 (PER-
CENTAGE SAYING THAT THEIR
COUNTRY’S MEMBERSHIP
IS A GOOD THING)
pean integration than the rest of
their compatriots, and this is one
of the most important attitudinal
cleavages within the respective
countries. Why?
TWO ANALYTICAL HYPOTHESES
Earlier analyses have suggested
two distinct types of underlying
causes. They might be described
as the &dquo;Cognitive Mobilization&dquo;
hypothesis and the &dquo;Materialist/
Post-Materialist&dquo; hypothesis, re-
spectively. Both hypotheses have
been developed in considerable de-
tail in previously published work.
We will provide only a brief sum-
mary of them here
The Cognitive Mobilization hy-
pothesis argues that the rising edu-
cational levels of recent decades,
coupled with the growing avail-
ability of information about things
happening in distant places, is con-
ducive to an increasingly cosmopoli-
tan outlook on the part of Western
publics. The ability to handle ab-
stractions, to process information
about remote and complex entities
(such as the European Community)
lies at the heart of the Cognitive
Mobilization process, and formal
education tends to increase these
skills. The illiterate peasant tends
to be a parochial whose. horizons
are limited to the village or rural
area in which he lives.&dquo; His in-
volvement in politics tends to be
based on personal loyalties and
word-of-mouth communications.
The relatively well-educated pub-
lics of contemporary Western Europe
are far better equipped to under-
stand and take part in politics at
the national level. To a greater
degree than was true in the past,
they are able to process informa-
tion about what is happening in
Europe as a whole, and the pene-
tration of electronic communications
media makes such information
readily available. One consequence
is that these publics are relatively
likely to know about and discuss
European politics and to view things
from a European perspective. For
10. For a fuller discussion of "Cognitive
Mobilization" see Inglehart, "Cognitive Mo-
bilization and European Identity," Compara-
tive Politics 3, 1 (October 1970) pp. 45-70;
the Materialist/Post-Materialist hypothesis
was first developed in Inglehart, "Changing
Value Priorities and European Integration,"
Journal of Common Market Studies 10, 1
(September 1971) pp. 1-36. Both themes
have been explored further in Inglehart,
The Silent Revolution, Chaps. 2, 11, 12.
11. The classic empirically based study of
parochial versus cosmopolitan worldviews
among mass publics is that of Daniel Lerner,
The Passing of Traditional Society (New
York: Free Press, 1958). In their seminal
study, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1963), Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba document the importance
of formal education in promoting a sense of
"subjective political competence" and a
participant role in politics. We view Cogni-
tive Mobilization as an extension of the
social mobilization process that continues
within the individual after the external land-
marks of social mobilization (such as ur-
banization, universal suffrage, industrializa-
tion and compulsory education) have been
completed. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social
Mobilization and Political Development,"
American Political Science Review 55, 2 (Sep-
tember, 1961) pp. 493-514.
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many (especially among the publics
of the original six member coun-
tries) the European Community has
become a familiar object rather than
something strange and threatening.
The MaterialistlPost-Materialist
hypothesis holds that people have a
variety of needs, ranging from
needs for subsistence and physical
safety, to needs for belonging, soli-
darity, esteem and realization of
one’s intellectual and esthetic po-
tential. Though all of these things
are valued, people give priority
in their values and behavior to
those needs that are in relatively
short supply.
Throughout most of recorded his-
tory, most people have been pre-
occupied by the struggle for mate-
rial survival. But the unprecedented
prosperity of western countries in
recent decades has led to the emer-
gence of substantial numbers of
Post-Materialists-people who give
top priority to the needs for be-
longing and self-realization. A Mate-
rialist value type (that gives top
priority to the sustenance and safety
needs) remains far more numerous,
however.
One’s basic value priorities tend
to crystalize during pre-adult years
and change relatively little there-
after. Accordingly, one’s relative em-
phasis on survival or higher-order
needs is a relatively fixed char-
acteristic and not simply a response
to the immediate environment. In a
given setting, the Materialist value
type tends to focus mainly on the
pursuit of economic and physical
security, while the Post-Materialist
type places more emphasis on be-
longing and intellectual pursuits.
One consequence is that, quite apart
from their relative levels of Cogni-
tive Mobilization, the Post-Material-
ists are more likely to take an
interest in remote and abstract
causes-European integration being
one of many possibilities-and to
place relatively heavy emphasis on
a sense of European solidarity (as
one of numerous possible ways to
satisfy the need for belonging).
The two hypotheses that we have
just sketched out imply that rela-
tively well-educated and economi-
cally-secure groups will tend to be
relatively favorable to European
integration, other things being equal.
This is not an iron law of uni-
versal determinism, merely a prob-
able relationship. It is possible, for
example, that a Post-Materialist
might seek to attain a sense of
belonging through involvement in
some cause aimed at political dis-
integration rather than integration:
Belgium’s Flemish separatists seem
to constitute a case in point. Never-
theless, those with Post-Materialist
value priorities have a relatively
high potential for mobilization in
support of such causes as European
integration; and the higher their
level of Cognitive Mobilization,
the greater their potential for in-
volvement.
The implications for European in-
tegration of these two hypotheses
were subjected to empirical tests
based on survey data from 1970
and 1973, and the results generally
support the interpretation just given.12
12. For a detailed account of the opera-
tionalization and testing of these hypotheses,
see the sources cited in n. 11. Very briefly, we
hypothesized that those who had spent their
formative years in economic and physical
security would be most likely to have Post-
Materialist values. Accordingly, the indicator
of value type used in this article is based on
responses to the following questions:
If you had to choose among the following
things, which are the two that seem most
desirable to you?"
&mdash;Maintaining order in the nation




-Protecting freedom of speech.
The first item, Order, was designed to tap
concerns for physical safety; the third item,
rising prices, was designed to tap a concern for
economic stability. The two other items
reflect nonmaterial, expressive concerns. On
the basis of their two choices, our respondents
thus fell into three categories: the Materialists
(those who chose the first and third items
together); the Post-Materialists (those who
chose the second and fourth items together);
and the Mixed types (those choosing any of
the four remaining combinations). While this
simple 4-item battery provides a parsimonious
and fairly effective indicator of value priorities,
a 12-item battery has been developed that is
more accurate and reliable. It is more difficult
to measure skills than attitudes in a public
opinion survey. For practical reasons, our
measures of cognitive level are indirect. The
Cognitive Mobilization indicator used here is
based on responses to two questions that have
become standard items in the European
Community surveys. They are:
When you get together with your friends,
would you say that you discuss political
matters frequently, occasionally, or never?
When you, yourself, hold a strong opinion,
do you ever find yourself persuading your
friends, relatives or fellow workers to share
your views? (if yes): Does this happen
often, from time to time or rarely?
Our reasoning in using these items as indi-
cators of skills (which clearly, they do not
measure directly) is that those who know and
understand something about political life are
most likely to discuss it; and that those most
skilled in argumentation are most apt to at-
tempt to persuade others to adopt their
opinions. Needless to say, this is not always
true. But overall, the &dquo;Mobilized&dquo; responses
to these items show strong positive correla-
tions with one’s level of political information,
sense of political competence and education,
as is demonstrated in Inglehart, The Silent
Revolution, Chapter 11. We dichotomized
between relatively &dquo;High&dquo; and &dquo;Low&dquo; levels
of Cognitive Mobilization by classing as
&dquo;high&dquo; those who discuss politics &dquo;frequently&dquo;
or &dquo;occasionally,&dquo; and persuaded other people
&dquo;often&dquo; or &dquo;from time to time.&dquo; Those who
discussed politics &dquo;frequently&dquo; were ranked
&dquo;high&dquo; even if they didn’t persuade others to
accept their views. The remaining respondents
were classed as &dquo;Low&dquo; on Cognitive Mobili-
zation. Obviously, this is a generous definition
of &dquo;High&dquo; levels of Cognitive Mobilization-
One wonders, however, how well
the empirical relationships observed
in the early 1970’s would hold up
in the changed socioeconomic en-
vironment of the late 1970’s.
In order to examine the current
relevance of mass publics’ value
priorities and cognitive skills to sup-
port for European integration, we set
out to develop a typology that would
enable us to measure the combined
effects of the two variables. A typol-
ogy seemed useful because, while
the Post-Materialist type tends to
rank high on Cognitive Mobiliza-
tion, there is nothing that approaches
a one-to-one relationship, empiri-
cally. Moreover, the effects of the
two variables are not necessarily
additive: they display some interest-
ing interaction effects, as we will
see below.
A series of typological analyses
were carried out in order to examine
the relative homogeneity of various
groups in regard to values, levels of
Cognitive Mobilization and certain
related attitudes. 13 The results of
these analyses support the construc-
tion of a typology based on two sets
of three groups: the six types
consist of, on one hand, the Material-
ist, Post-Materialist and Mixed (or
intermediate) value types among
those with relatively low levels of
Cognitive Mobilization; and the Ma-
terialist, Post-Materialist and Mixed
value types among those respond-
ents having relatively high levels
of Cognitive Mobilization.
But in addition to these six groups,
but even by this liberal standard, the majority
of the public fell into the "Low" category.
13. Much of the groundwork for the Politi-
cal Orientation Typology used here was laid
by Bruno Roche of the Institut Francais
d’Opinion Publique, who carried out an ini-
tial series of typological analyses. The authors
are indebted to M. Roche for his contri-
butions.
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the typological analyses point to the
existence of a seventh group, hav-
ing such distinctive characteristics
that it should be treated as a sepa-
rate category in the typology. The
respondents in this seventh group
were identified by their responses
to the question:
On this card are three basic kinds
of attitudes toward the society in which
we live. Please choose the one which
best describes your own opinion:
1. The entire way our society is or-
ganized must be radically changed
by revolutionary action.
2. Our society must be gradually changed
by reforms.
3. Our present society must be valiantly
defended against all subversive
forces.
As shorthand terms one might refer
to the three respective options as
Revolution, Reform, and Reaction.
In November 1977 the percentages
choosing each option in the Com-
munity as a whole (weighted accord-
ing to population) were 6 percent,
55 percent and 32 percent respec-
tively-with 7 percent giving no
answer.
While those who choose the first
or Revolutionary option constituted
only six percent of the European
public, they are a particularly inter-
esting and highly distinctive group.
In regard to both value priorities
and Cognitive Mobilization, there
was considerably more difference
between the Revolutionaries and
the Reformists than between the Re-
formists and the Reactionaries or
nonresponding groups. Specifically,
the Revolutionaries have dispropor-
tionately high levels of political
interest and activity in discussions;
and a quite disproportionate tend-
ency to be Post-Materialists. We
hasten to emphasize that it would
be a serious error to conclude that
all Post-Materialists are potential
Revolutionaries. There is a Re-
formist majority among all three
value types. But when we focus
our attention on the two extremes
of the Revolutionary-Reactionary
continuum, we find striking differ-
ences according to value type.
Among the Materialists, Reac-
tionaries outnumber Revolutionaries
by an overwhelming 10:1 ratio.
Among the mixed value types Reac-
tionaries outnumber Revolutionaries
by 4:1. But among the Post-Material-
ist group, the ratio is approximately
1:1-with Revolutionaries more nu-
merous than Reactionaries. The
Revolutionaries resemble the Post-
Materialists in being considerably
younger and better educated than
the population at large. Further-
more, the two groups are similar
in showing a decided preference
for the political parties of the Left.
But in other crucial respects they
are dramatically different, as we will
see shortly. Consequently, we con-
structed a Political Orientation Ty-
pology containing seven, rather than
six groups, using the procedure
shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7 shows the percentage
of the European Community public
(weighted according to population)
falling into each of the seven types
in Fall 1977. We replicated this
procedure using data from the Fall
1976,surveys. The distribution of the
respective types proved to be quite
stable: in Fall 1977 six of the seven
groups were within one percent of
their Fall 1976 distributions. The
seventh group-the Mobilized Ma-
terialists-increased from 12 per-
cent of the total in 1976 to 14
percent in 1977. There was a shift
toward Materialism from 1976 to
1977, and it was concentrated among
those ranking high on Cognitive
Mobilization. The Non-Mobilized
Materialists showed no gain.
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FIGURE 7
CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION
TYPOLOGY. PERCENTAGES IN EACH CATEGORY
ARE BASED ON FALL, 1977 SURVEY.
Let us examine some of the
politically relevant characteristics of
the seven groups in our typology.
A standard item in the European
Community surveys is the question:
In political matters people often talk
of ’the Left’ and ’the Right.’ How would
you place your own views on this scale?&dquo;
[The respondent is given a scale divided
into ten boxes, running from Left to
Right. At the left end of the card, the
word &dquo;Left&dquo; appears and at the right
end, the word &dquo;Right&dquo;. The ten boxes
are numbered from 1 to 10 and the
respondent is asked to give the number
of the position at which he would place
himself. If he or she hesitates, he or
she is asked to try again].
Table 8 shows the mean score on the
Left-Right ideology scale for each of
the seven groups in our typology.
At a given level of Cognitive
Mobilization, Materialists are sub-
stantially more likely to place them-
selves on the Right than are Post-
Materialists-with the mixed types
falling in between. But note that
Cognitive Mobilization drives the
Materialists and Post-Materialists in
opposite directions: the mobilized
Materialists fall at the extreme Right
of our seven groups, while the mo-
bilized Post-Materialists place them-
selves to the Left of any group
except the Revolutionaries. Not sur-
prisingly, the Revolutionaries fall
well to the Left of any other group.
The fact that Cognitive Mobiliza-
tion moves the Materialists and Post-
Materialists in opposite directions
seems logical: The Post-Materialists
have, according to our hypotheses,
emerged only recently and still
constitute a minority group in socie-
ties that have, for some time, been
largely oriented toward maximizing
Materialist values. The Post-Ma-
terialists’ basic priorities differ from
those that predominate in their
societies-and consequently, they
are relatively likely to support
social change, despite their rela-
tively affluent backgrounds. The
Materialists are in the opposite
situation. Thus, Cognitive Mobiliza-
tion drives the two groups in op-
posite directions because those with
relatively high levels of cognitive
skills presumably find it easier to
select the ideological position that
best expresses their underlying
values.
This is only the first of several
interaction effects associated with
TABLE 8
SELF-PLACEMENT ON LEFT-RIGHT SCALE BY
GROUPS IN POLITICAL ORIENTATION TY-
POLOGY* (MEAN SCORE SHOWN FOR
EACH GROUP: 1.00 = EXTREME
LEFT, 10.00 = EXTREME RIGHT)
* Fall, 1976 nine-station survey.
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our typology. We find a similar pat-
tern in response to the question:
&dquo;If there were a General Election
tomorrow [to respondents under 18,
add: &dquo;And you had a vote&dquo;], which
party would you support?&dquo; For
purposes of cross-national compari-
sons, the political parties of the nine
countries are coded as belonging to
the Left, the Right, or as unclassi-
fiable on this basis. In most coun-
tries the task is reasonably simple.
In Great Britain and Germany,
for example, the Labour and Social
Democratic parties respectively are
viewed as the Left, while the Con-
servative and Christian Democratic
Parties make up the Right. In
France, the parties of the Giscardien
-Gaullist governing coalition-are
considered to constitute the Right,
while all major opposition parties
make up the Left. In Italy, the
picture is more complex, but there
is general agreement that the Com-
munists, Socialists and Social Demo-
crats (and, usually, the tiny Republi-
can Party) make up the Left, while
the Christian Democrats, Liberals
and Neo-Fascists are coded as Right.
In the remaining countries, apart
from Ireland, informed observers
are able to say, with high inter-
coder reliability, which parties com-
prise the Left or Right. For Ireland
the Left-Right dimension is almost
meaningless, but we coded the Fine
Gael party as Left on the grounds
that it was allied with the Irish
Labour Party-which can be placed
on the Left with some confidence.
By the process of elimination, this
implied that the Fianna Fail must
constitute the Irish Right.
Table 9 shows the percentages
voting for the Right in the Euro-
pean Community as a whole. 14 We
TABLE 9
POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE OF GROUPS IN
POLITICAL ORIENTATION TYPOLOGY*
(PERCENTAGE SUPPORTING
PARTIES OF THE RIGHT)
.. - . - - .. - .. 
, ,
*Combined Fall, 1976 and Fall, 1977 survey
results.
find exactly the same type of inter-
action effect here as in connection
with the respondents’ description of
their political views. The mobilized
Materialists are the most conserva-
tive of any group (62 percent of
them reporting that they would vote
for a party of the Right) while
the mobilized Post-Materialists are
the most Left-oriented of any group
-except the Revolutionaries. Fig-
ure 8 gives a graphic presentation
of the effects of values and Cog-
nitive Mobilization on Left-Right
ideological self-placement and on
Left-Right voting interactions. The
interaction effects visible here indi-
cate that in a simple additive
model, the political impact of both
values and cognitive skills would
tend to be underestimated.
In everything we have seen up
to this point, the Revolutionaries
resemble the Post-Materialists-es-
pecially the mobilized ones. Simi-
lar in social background character-
istics, in ideological self-placement,
14. Table 9 combines results from the Fall
1976 and Fall 1977 surveys in order to
compensate for relatively large amounts of
missing data due to nonresponse and because
Centrist parties, such as the British Liberals,
or nonclassifiable parties, such as the Belgian
ethnic separatists, are excluded from these
tables.
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(a) Mean Self-Placement on Left-Right Ideology Scale:
(b) Percentage Voting for Parties of the Right:
FIGURE 8
LOCATION ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION OF
GROUPS IN POLITICAL ORIENTATION
TYPOLOGY.
and in their political party prefer-
ences, one might be tempted to
conclude that the Revolutionaries
are just like the Mobilized Post-
Materialists, only more so. This
conclusion would be mistaken.
Though they overlap in many re-
spects, the Revolutionaries are a
highly distinctive type-and in
some ways they lie at the opposite
end of the continuum from the Mo-
bilized Post-Materialists. This fact
is particularly relevant to our cen-
tral interest in this article-public
attitudes toward European integra-
tion. For the European integration
movement is a Reformist strategy
par excellence. It is supported by
those who wish to improve the
existing social order, more than
by those who seek to defend the
status quo. But the Revolutionaries
constitute a group that is dedicated
to abolishing the existing system,
not repairing it. For the Revolu-
tionary Left, reforming the system
is merely a way to ward off total
overhaul: viewed in this light, Euro-
pean integration may seem counter-
productive.
Table 10 shows the percentages
making positive assessment of Com-
mon Market membership among the
seven groups in our typology. In
contrast with the two preceding
tables, in which Revolutionaries
and Mobilized Post-Materialists oc-
cupy adjacent positions, here they
fall at opposite ends of the spec-
trum. Another contrast with the pre-
ceding tables is the fact that here,
Cognitive Mobilization and value
priorities have additive effects, with
favorable assessments rising in a
smooth progression as we move from
the nonmobilized Materialists, at the
low extreme, to the Mobilized
Post-Materialists, who make the
most favorable assessments. But the
Revolutionaries rank lowest of any
group, with a percentage of favor-
able assessments that puts them sub-
stantially below the non-Mobilized
Materialists-in other respects the
group they resemble least.
Is this an isolated phenomenon?
TABLE 10
APPRAISAL OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEM-
BERSHIP BY GROUPS IN POLITICAL ACTION
TYPOLOGY* (PERCENTAGE SAYING
THAT THEIR COUNTRY’S MEM-
BERSHIP IS A GOOD THING)
* Fall, 1977 Survey, weighted according to
population.
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Let us compare the proportions who
feel that their representatives in
the European Parliament should act
for the good of the Community as a
whole, even if it conflicts with the
national interest. Table 11 provides
the relevant data. And the basic
pattern is similar to what we have
just seen. Willingness to give pri-
ority to the interests of the Com-
munity is lowest among nonmo-
bilized Materialists and reaches its
peak among the mobilized Post-
Materialists. But the impact of value
type dominates that of Cognitive
Mobilization: the mobilized Ma-
terialists are more European than
nonmobilized ones, and the same
thing is true of each of the other
value types when we compare the
mobilized with the nonmobilized
group. But the effect of Cognitive
Mobilization alone is not great
enough to raise all of the mo-
bilized types above the nonmo-
bilized ones.
The results of these analyses
help clarify the complex relation-
ship between support for European
integration and Left-Right dimen-
sion. For both Left and Right have
several distinct constituencies,
drawing varying amounts of support
TABLE 11
NATIONAL INTEREST VS. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
INTEREST BY GROUPS IN POLITICAL ORIENTA-
TION TYPOLOGY* (PERCENTAGE
GIVING PRIORITY TO EUROPE
AS A WHOLE)
* Fall, 1977 survey, weighted according to pop-
ulation.
from each of our seven types.
One major group is Materialist,
concerned primarily with attain-
ing-or defending-economic and
physical security. For this group, it
seems likely that support for Euro-
pean integration has had particularly
strong linkages with the perception
that it was associated with pros-
perity. In the uncertain setting of
the late 1970’s, this component of
support was relatively weak. Both
mobilized and nonmobilized Mate-
rialists made comparatively negative
assessments of Community mem-
bership, and were relatively hesi-
tant to let the interests of the
Community as a whole take prece-
dence over their own country’s im-
mediate interests. For the Post-
Materialists, on the other hand,
European integration’s appeal may
be rooted to a greater extent in
concerns for human solidarity, even
apart from its economic effects.
This is not to say that concerns
for solidarity were unimportant to
those with Materialist or Mixed
values; it is simply a question of
the relative weights.
The Revolutionaries are a special
case. Like the Post-Materialists, they
tend to support social change; ac-
cordingly, both groups place them-
selves on the Left of the political
spectrum. But the two groups’ ideo-
logical perspectives differ. For the
Reformist Left, the construction of a
supranational European Community,
aimed at superseding the nation-
state, may seem a major advance
having farreaching implications. For
the Revolutionary Left, it may seem
like a diversion or even a hin-
drance to more drastic forms of
change. The two groups part com-
pany on this issue, with the Revolu-
tionary Left taking a position ad-
jacent to that of the nonmobilized
Materialists. Ironically, a Reaction-
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ary impulse was particularly strong
among the latter group. Although
its members have lower levels of
income and education than any
other group, which previously might
have tied them more strongly to
the Left, in 1977 advocates of &dquo;a
valiant defense of the present so-
ciety against all subversive forces&dquo;
vastly outweighed proponents of
revolutionary change. The nonmo-
bilized Materialists were concerned
by the current crisis, but were more
apt to see the solution in a restora-
tion of the prosperous industrial
society they had known in the re-
cent past, than in revolutionary
change. For opposite reasons, the
Revolutionaries and nonmobilized
Materialists were reluctant to sup-
port European integration.
The relationship between Left-
Right political preferences and sup-
port for European integration is
complex. While the Reformist Left is
markedly favorable, the Revolu-
tionary Left tends to be suspicious.
But the complexity does not end
there, because one finds striking
cross-national differences in the de-
gree to which the supporters of the
Left and Right hold positive atti-
tudes toward the Community. Ta-
ble 12 gives some evidence on this
score. In Italy, the country with the
largest Communist Party in Western
Europe, the Left is highly favorable
to EEC membership; this holds true
of both Communist and Socialist
electorates, when we analyze them
separately. Clearly, we cannot equate
the Revolutionary Left with support
for the Communist Party. Most Ital-
ian Communists are non-Revolu-
tionary. In Germany, where the So-
cial Democrats have been in power
since 1969 (and have shared power
since 1966), the electorate of the
Left is somewhat more favorable
to the Community and to European
solidarity than the electorate of the
Right. Overall, there is a clear cor-
relation between support for the
parties in office-whether of the
Left or the Right-and support for
the Community. When the Left has
been in power for some period of
time, there is a tendency for its
supporters to identify with its poli-
cies, including support for Euro-
pean integration, if that is one of
them. Accordingly, in the Nether-
lands, where a coalition headed by
the Left was in office from 1972 to
1977, the differences between sup-
porters of the Left and Right are
negligible; in earlier surveys, the
electorate of the Left was slightly
more favorable to European inte-
gration than that of the Right.
Political party cleavages on this
issue are greatest by far in Denmark,
TABLE 12
APPRAISAL OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP BY POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE
BY NATION* (PERCENTAGE SAYING THEIR COUNTRY’S MEMBERSHIP IS A GOOD THING)
* Fall, 1977 survey, weighted according to population..
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one of the new member countries.
Here, the polarization between Left
and Right is immense; a gulf of 40
percentage points separates the two
electorates. This polarization domi-
nates all other variables, including
the Political Orientation typology.
In the nine nations as a whole, this
typology is the strongest individual-
level predictor of one’s assessment
of membership and of support for
European over national interests.
In Denmark, both political party
preference and occupation of head
of household have stronger explana-
tory power than does the typology.
In general, the effects attributable
to the Political Orientation typology
are weaker in the three new member
countries than in the original six.
As was noted above, the impact of
the immediate environment tends to
be greater in the new member coun-
tries than in the old; and both value
type and level of Cognitive Mo-
bilization are, theoretically, rela-
tively stable characteristics of given
individuals.
To a limited extent-though only
a limited one-our indicators of
values and cognitive levels help
explain the long-term continuity in
favorable assessments of EEC mem-
bership that was noted in the first
part of this article. When we aggre-
gate mean scores on our values
index to the national level, the result
shows a correlation of .457 with
favorable assessments of member-
ship across the nine nations across
time. Similarly aggregated to the
nation level, our index of Cognitive
Mobilization has a .356 correlation. 15
These correlations are somewhat
stronger than those obtained with
any of the economic indicators dis-
cussed in the earlier section.
Both Post-Materialist values and
high levels of Cognitive Mobiliza-
tion are somewhat more pr6valent
among the publics of the original
Six than among the Three-prob-
ably a reflection of the fact that
the three new members have some-
what lower economic levels: while
Denmark is highly prosperous, both
Ireland and Britain rank at or near
the bottom of the Community rank-
ings in gross domestic product per
capita. Nevertheless, we should not
make too much of these findings.
When we add these two variables
to a multiple regression that in-
cludes the economic indicators dis-
cussed previously, and the dummy
variable based on early versus late
membership, the latter variable re-
mains-by far-the strongest pre-
dictor of favorable or unfavorable
assessments of the Community. 16
The effects attributable to value type
and to Cognitive Mobilization levels
may contribute to the stability of
attitudes observed at the aggregate
level. They do not explain away the
effects associated with sheer length
of membership.
We have examined the degree to
which various groups make favor-
able or unfavorable assessments of
membership in the EEC, and the
degree to which they feel that repre-
sentatives to the European Parlia-
ment should work on behalf of Com-
15. It should be noted that these figures are
somewhat less reliable than those in our
earlier aggregate analyses, because neither
the values indicator nor the Cognitive
Mobilization indicator was included in all the
surveys conducted since 1973. Our N’s in the
present correlations fall to 45 and 63,
respectively. Even with these reduced N’s,
the relationships are significant at better than
the .01 level, however.
16. In principle, a multistage causal model
would be desirable here, but in view of our
reduced N’s we will not press the data any
farther. It seems advisable to wait until the




EXPECTED RATE OF PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS
TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BY POLITICAL
ORIENTATION TYPOLOGY* (PERCENTAGE
SAYING THEY WILL CERTAINLY
OR PROBABLY VOTE)
. ~~ - ~ ~ .._
* Fall, 1977 survey, weighted according to
population.
munity interests, or those of one
particular nation. In 1979 the publics
of the nine countries will have a
chance to elect representatives
pledged to act on behalf of given
viewpoints. Will they take this
opportunity?
One might expect those who are
least enthusiastic about Community
membership to show the lowest
rates of turnout in the elections to
the European Parliament, and to
some extent this is the case. Table
13 shows the percentage saying
(in Fall 1977) that they would
certainly or probably vote in these
elections, among each of the seven
groups in our typology. Here, the
effects of Cognitive Mobilization
dominate those of value type, but
within each cognitive level the
Post-Materialists are most likely to
vote, and the Revolutionaries seem
least likely to vote. Being a group
that otherwise shows quite high
levels of political interest and parti-
san attachment, this tendency on
the part of the Revolutionaries
may change as the election cam-
paign gets under way-17 A year and a
half before the elections, the Revo-
lutionary type showed a markedly
low intention to vote.
This was not true of the Left in
general, however. Though they
were somewhat less favorable than
the Right in their assessments of
Community membership, the sup-
porters of the Left showed a slightly
higher rate of certain or probable
voting expectations. The Left’s rela-
tively high expected turnout seems
to reflect differential rates of party
identification-for whether or not
one will vote seems to depend,
above all, on whether or not one
feels a sense of attachment to some
political party. Table 14 shows the
expected rates of turnout, according
to strength of party attachments.
It appears that partisan cues will
play a double role in shaping the
TABLE 14
EXPECTED RATE OF PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS
TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BY PARTY
IDENTIFICATION* (PERCENTAGE
SAYING THEY WILL CERTAINLY
OR PROBABLY VOTE)
* Fall, 1977 survey, weighted according to
population.
17. This statement needs to be qualified. In
the Community as a whole, the Revolu-
tionaries show substantially higher levels of
Cognitive Mobilization and attachment to
political parties than does the population at
large. Neither of these characteristics applies
to the Revolutionaries in our samples from the
United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland.
The relative weakness of a Marxist tradition in
the British Isles seems to give support for
revolutionary change a different significance
from what it has on the Continent.
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character of the new European Par-
liament. To an extent that varies
greatly from nation to nation, they
seem relevant to whether one em-
phasizes a European or a national
frame of reference. In all nine coun-
tries, they seem highly relevant to
whether or not one will vote in the
European elections.
CONCLUSION
Public assessments of the benefits
of membership in the Common Mar-
ket wavered in the face of the
economic crisis that took place
shortly after expansion of the Com-
munity, and it seems possible to
attribute some of the ups and downs
to specific economic factors. But
these assessments showed more
stability than one might have ex-
pected, given the severe economic
perturbations that took place. In
part this stability seems linked with
long-term developments in the val-
ues and cognitive skills of Western
publics. To an even greater degree
it seems to reflect whether a given
public has experienced membership
in the Community for a relatively
long or a relatively short period of
years. Even among the publics of
the three new countries, there are
indications of a growing sense of
Community solidarity. A readiness
to pursue the common good rather
than simply the immediate interests
of a particular nation is already
fairly widespread among the pub-
lics of the European Community.
Whether the political leaders of the
nine nations will act to encourage
or to diminish this sense of soli-
darity remains to be seen.
